

## Reformed Evidentialism and Epistemic Responsibility

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### Abstract

The Reformed Epistemology, developed by Alvin Plantinga, seeks to argue that belief in God can be considered properly basic in terms of justification and warrant. Plantinga claims that a theistic believer does not need evidential reasons for their belief in God. However, some may argue that, due to the lack of evidence, Reformed Epistemology could be considered epistemically irresponsible. This objection, grounded on Clifford's evidentialism, claims that a responsible epistemology is deeply related to sufficient evidence, and Plantinga's epistemology does not care about sufficient evidence about God. To answer the quoted objection, this paper aims to relate Plantinga's epistemology to an evidentialist defence of theistic belief. For this, Swinburne's cumulative case, which defends that the existence of God is more likely than not, will be particularly analysed, defending that, if Swinburne's argument is good, then it can be helpful to a rational belief in God. The goal is to demonstrate how evidentialism can complement Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology, strengthening the credence of belief in God. This claim is called Reformed Evidentialism. In conclusion, it will be argued that although theistic belief may be considered properly basic, an evidentialist approach like Swinburne's cumulative case can increase the credence of theistic belief. Consequently, Reformed Evidentialism is not epistemically irresponsible; after all, although belief in God is properly basic, and not based on evidence, a theistic believer who knows the evidence can consider the evidence carefully.

**Keywords:** Reformed Epistemology, Alvin Plantinga, Evidentialism, Epistemic responsibility, Richard Swinburne.

### [EVIDENCIALISMO REFORMADO E RESPONSABILIDADE EPISTÊMICA]

#### Resumo

A Epistemologia Reformada, desenvolvida por Alvin Plantinga, visa argumentar que a crença em Deus pode ser considerada apropriadamente básica em termos de justificação e aval. Plantinga afirma que um crente teísta não precisa de razões evidenciais para a sua crença em Deus. No entanto, alguns podem argumentar que, devido à falta de evidências, a Epistemologia Reformada poderia ser considerada epistemicamente irresponsável. Tal objeção, baseada no evidencialismo de Clifford, afirma que uma epistemologia responsável está profundamente relacionada com uma evidência suficiente, e a epistemologia de Plantinga não se preocupa com uma evidência suficiente acerca de Deus. Para responder à objeção citada, este trabalho pretende relacionar a epistemologia de Plantinga com uma defesa evidencialista da crença teísta. Para isso,

será particularmente analisado o caso cumulativo de Swinburne, o qual defende que a existência de Deus é mais provável do que não, defendendo que, se o argumento de Swinburne for bom, então pode ser útil para uma crença racional em Deus. O objetivo é demonstrar como o evidencialismo pode complementar a Epistemologia Reformada de Plantinga, reforçando a credencial da crença em Deus. Esta afirmação é chamada de Evidencialismo Reformado. Em conclusão, argumentar-se-á que, embora a crença teísta possa ser considerada apropriadamente básica, uma abordagem evidencialista como o caso cumulativo de Swinburne pode aumentar a credencial da crença teísta. Consequentemente, o Evidencialismo Reformado não é epistemicamente irresponsável; afinal, embora a crença em Deus seja apropriadamente básica, e não baseada em evidências, um crente teísta que conheça as evidências pode considerá-las cuidadosamente.

**Palavras-chave:** Epistemologia Reformada, Alvin Plantinga, Evidencialismo, Responsabilidade epistêmica, Richard Swinburne.

## 1 - Introduction

Reformed Epistemology claims that, if true, theistic belief can be knowledge even without evidential reasons for belief in God. The basic idea, found in books like *God and Other Minds* by Alvin Plantinga (1967) and *Faith and Rationality*, edited by Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (1983), was developed in more details in the book *Warranted Christian Belief* by Plantinga (2000). So, the central thesis is that belief in God is properly basic. Theistic belief is *basic* because the belief is not based on other evidence. The belief is *properly* basic because it satisfies the epistemic conditions to be considered basic.

However, there is an objection that Reformed Epistemology is, in some way, epistemically irresponsible. After all, according to the reformed epistemologist we do not need evidence to believe in something like God. And a philosopher inspired by W. K. Clifford can think: Well, it is wrong to believe without evidence because belief without evidence is dangerous for society and the people can be credulous and back to savagery. I think that this objection is the core of Clifford's *The Ethics of Belief* (1879 [1876]). For some people (philosophers obviously included), epistemic responsibility is deeply related to adequate evidence. Therefore, if a religious epistemology does not think about the importance of evidence, this religious epistemology is irresponsible. Of course, Reformed Epistemology is, in this view, an irresponsible epistemology.

To answer this objection, I will defend what I call *Reformed Evidentialism*, which is defined as the claim that, although that belief in God can be properly basic, evidential reasons can give more epistemic responsibility for a theistic believer.

Therefore, I will discuss the epistemological notions of Plantinga, mainly John Calvin's *sensus divinitatis*, defending that belief in God can be properly basic. Thus, I am going to expound the basic claim of Reformed Evidentialism, using Swinburne's cumulative case as an example, defending that this argument does not prove the existence of God, but demonstrates that the theistic believer is rational. I also will defend that the knowledge of this argument can provide a situation in which, if theistic belief is true, the *sensus divinitatis* generates belief in God. Finally, my conclusion is that, even if theistic belief is properly basic (a conclusion of Reformed Epistemology), an evidential approach like Swinburne's cumulative case can increase the credence of theistic belief. This approach can demonstrate how a reformed epistemologist can be epistemically responsible.

## 2 – Reformed Epistemology

To describe the Reformed Epistemology, I am going first to consider the evidentialist challenge against theistic belief. Secondly, I am going to demonstrate how Plantinga responds to this challenge through the Reformed Epistemology, defending that belief in God can be properly basic.

A famous example of the evidentialist challenge against theistic belief is made by Anthony Flew in his paper *The Presumption of Atheism*, in which he defends that

- (1) The theistic believer is rational if and only if he provides sufficient evidence for belief in God.
- (2) The theistic believer does not provide sufficient evidence for belief in God.  
By *modus tollens*, the necessary conclusion of (1) and (2) is:
- (3) The theistic believer is not rational.

The result of these notions is that the theistic believer is, in Plantinga's words, "irrational, or unreasonable, or contrary to one's intellectual obligations" (Plantinga 2000, pp. 81). It is clear in Flew's paper that he does not object to the *truth* of theistic belief, but only to the idea that this belief, if true, constitutes knowledge. Therefore, even if theistic belief is true, the believer does not have sufficient reasons for his belief and he does not have rationality or knowledge (Flew 2010, pp. 453).

Some theistic philosophers respond to Flew's challenge defending that (2) is false: we have sufficient good reason to believe in the existence of God. It is the case of Richard Swinburne, who made a natural theology based on public evidence (Swinburne 2010, pp. 685). The result of this cumulative case is, according to Swinburne, that "the experience of so many people in their moments of religious vision corroborates what nature and history show to be quite likely – that there is a God who made and sustains man and the universe" (Swinburne 2004, pp. 342).

Independent if Swinburne is right or not, Plantinga intends to answer the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief rejecting (1): the idea that theistic believer needs evidential reasons for his belief. Therefore, Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology defends that theistic belief does not need evidential reasons to be rational and, if true, knowledge.

Plantinga's rejection of the idea that evidential reasons are necessary for the rationality of theistic belief appears first in *God and Other Minds* (1967). In this work it is defended that the traditional arguments in favour of theistic belief fail. Plantinga also defends that the analogical position, the best argument for belief in other minds, suffers from the same problem that is present in the teleological argument for the existence of God. He concludes: "if my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latter" (Plantinga 1967, pp. 271). There are many controversies about Plantinga's treatment to theistic arguments and the problem of other minds. It is not the aim of this paper to consider these questions. However, the reformed epistemologist goes beyond and makes a serious objection against the basis of Flew's affirmation.

Flew's affirmation is based on classical foundationalism, which says that a belief *P* is justified for *S* if and only if *either* (1) *P* is self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to senses for *S*; *or* (2) *S* believes in *P* on the evidential basis (Plantinga 2000, pp. 106). The problem with this notion is that classical foundationalism has self-referential problems because it does not obey the criterion itself. Therefore, the theistic believer is not rationally obliged to accept Flew's perspectives about the *presumption of atheism*.

However, what does *rationality* mean? Plantinga thinks in the *warrant* as the parameter to external rationality and knowledge. Therefore, after Gettier's objection to the idea that knowledge is justified true belief, epistemologists return to the question: what is the difference between mere true belief and knowledge? Plantinga's response is

the warrant. For Plantinga, the cognitive faculties or process generates a warranted belief if and only if:

- I – the cognitive faculties or processes are functioning properly;
- II – the environment (maxi and mini) of belief generation is adequate or favorable;
- III – the cognitive faculties or processes has the purpose of producing true beliefs;
- IV – the cognitive faculties or processes are successful in producing true beliefs.

For Plantinga, a warranted true belief can constitute knowledge. This position is a kind of externalism, which denies the internalist view that one can always have a form of access to the basis for one's knowledge and justified belief (Pappas, 2023). For an externalist like Plantinga, internal access to the basis of knowledge is not necessary, only the proper functioning of cognitive faculties in the correct conditions.

Therefore, here the question arises: can belief in God be warranted? To answer to this, Plantinga develops his Reformed Epistemology, inspired by Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin. Because of this inspiration, Plantinga's model is called Aquinas/Calvin or A/C model. Thus, the philosopher intends to demonstrate that, if theistic belief is true, then it can be knowledge. To describe Plantinga's religious epistemology, we need to consider what Calvin says in the *Institutes*: "There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity" (*Institutes*, I, iii, 1). Calvin, doubtlessly, is influenced by Saint Paul's text in *Romans* 1, where the apostle says that there is a natural knowledge of God.

What Calvin says is that all human beings have a doxastic mechanism called *sensus divinitatis*, which generates belief in God. About God's glory, Calvin affirms: "wherever you cast your eyes, there is no spot in the universe wherein you cannot discern at least some sparks of his glory" (*Institutes* I, v, 1). Commenting on this, Plantinga says, "Calvin's idea is that the workings of the *sensus divinitatis* is triggered or occasioned by a wide variety of circumstances" (Plantinga 2000, pp. 196).

As Helen De Cruz and Johan De Smedt says, "According to Reformed epistemologists, God has implanted in all human beings a *sensus divinitatis*, an innate propensity to form theistic belief in a broad range of environmental conditions" (2012, pp. 52). Between these environmental conditions or circumstances can be mentioned some examples: contemplate the Universe's beauty or a flower like a tulip; watch a Terrence Malick's movie; or look at the face of the beloved woman. The theistic believer that believes in God by the *sensus divinitatis* does not make an argument: his belief is, as Plantinga emphasises, basic: a properly basic belief (Plantinga 2000, pp. 197-201).

Seeing the *sensus divinitatis* as a doxastic mechanism, we can see how theistic belief may have warrant, if this belief is true. The cognitive faculty of *sensus divinitatis* satisfies the warrant conditions, because *sensus divinitatis* is functioning properly in an adequate environment, having success in producing true beliefs. Therefore, theistic belief can be knowledge if this belief is true. It is important to remember that *The Presumption of Atheism* does not object to the truth of theistic belief, but only at the idea that this belief, even if true, constitutes knowledge. Thus, a theistic believer can use the Reformed Epistemology to demonstrate Flew's mistake.

Plantinga's defense of his position is carefully crafted (Alston 1991, pp. 197). However, because of the absence of evidence, Reformed Epistemology does not give a reason for acceptance of theistic belief. On this point, Swinburne makes an interesting comment when he says that "in the modern world many people need their belief that there is a God to be based on and made probable by publicly observable evidence" (Swinburne 2010, pp. 685). As said at the beginning, a Cliffordian philosopher can think

that the Reformed Epistemology is epistemically irresponsible because of the absence of evidence.

### 3 – A Cliffordian objection

In his famous essay *The Ethics of Belief*, Clifford uses the example of a shipowner with doubts about the safety of his ship. Nevertheless, he decided, without sufficient evidence, trusting that the ship was safe. The result is that the ship went down in mid-ocean. So, Clifford intends to demonstrate that this belief without evidence is morally problematic. And it is one possible example of this. After all, Clifford's argument is that any belief without sufficient evidence can be dangerous for society. He describes this consequence as follows: "The danger to society is not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is great enough; but that it should become credulous, and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for then it must sink back into savagery" (Clifford 1876 [1879], pp. 185-186).

According to this view, the problem of Reformed Epistemology is that the theistic believer can believe in God without sufficient evidence – actually, without any evidence. And, although theistic belief itself is not a problem, theistic belief without sufficient evidence can make that people lose the habit of testing beliefs, which is irresponsible because "it must sink back into savagery". So, if a theistic believer can believe in God without sufficient evidence, we can have any superstitious belief without sufficient evidence. After all, the fact is that contemporary scientific worldview has an emphasis on evidential reasons for a belief. Obviously, scientific practice is epistemically responsible, and this responsibility is a reality because of the presence of sufficient evidence for belief in a scientific theory like the evolutionary theory.

Then, a Cliffordian philosopher could say, based on epistemic responsibility of scientific theories, that the Reformed Epistemology can lead us to a Dark Age of credulity and superstition. Because of this, the theistic believer that believes in God without sufficient evidence is epistemically irresponsible. This critic is like Desidério Murcho's comments on Reformed Epistemology; Murcho says that Plantinga's views lead to doxastic irresponsibility and epistemic fragility (2017, pp. 45-47). If this objection is correct, then the Reformed Epistemology is epistemically irresponsible.

This kind of objection is called "the Great Pumpkin Objection". The basic idea, as described above, is that, if belief in God can be properly basic, then any belief can be properly basic, including the superstitious belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every year at Halloween. In response, Plantinga says: "To recognize that some kinds of belief are properly basic with respect to warrant doesn't for a moment commit one to thinking all other kinds are" (Plantinga 2018, pp. 373). The inference from the proper basicity of theistic belief to the proper basicity of belief in the Great Pumpkin is not a good inference. Therefore, Plantinga's position is not committed to superstitious beliefs.

Of course, Plantinga is correct when he says that the Great Pumpkin Objection has an improper inference. But the problem is that it is insufficient. The fact that Reformed Epistemology is not committed to superstitious beliefs does not give a reason to adopt theistic belief instead of belief in the Great Pumpkin. Because of this, Plantinga's response does not defeat the objection that Reformed Epistemology is epistemically irresponsible. Still, Murcho can say that Plantinga's epistemology leads to doxastic irresponsibility and epistemic fragility.

To respond to this challenge, I will defend that an evidentialist approach can contribute to Reformed Epistemology. I call this approach, as said at the beginning, *Reformed Evidentialism*. As an example of my claim, I intend to focus specifically on the cumulative case of Richard Swinburne. Some observations: First, I will use "evidentialism" as the claim that we can make arguments in favor of theistic belief. This sense is different from the "evidentialism" criticised by Plantinga in his objection against



classical foundationalism; Plantinga's use of "evidentialism" is a good description of the Flew's presumption of atheism. Secondly, an interesting attempt to relate Reformed Epistemology and evidentialism was made by the Brazilian philosopher Bruno Uchôa. Uchôa argues that evidentialism can help the theistic believer to deal with possible defeaters of theistic belief (Uchôa 2011, pp. 240). I agree with Uchôa. However, I intend to go further, defending that evidentialism can be part of the generation of theistic belief.

#### 4 – Swinburne's cumulative case

One of the main defences of the existence of God in the analytic philosophy of religion is the cumulative argument formulated by Richard Swinburne. This argument, presented in the book *The Existence of God*, has an inductive character, and combines a series of micro arguments that, together, lead to the conclusion that the existence of God is most likely than not (Swinburne 2004, pp. 342). In this sense, Agnaldo Portugal is correct in affirming that Swinburne aims to put the theistic arguments in a form closer to modern scientific reasoning (2011, pp. 23). It does not matter in this section whether Swinburne's arguments are successful or not; after all, the point here is to demonstrate that, if Swinburne is right, then an evidentialist approach can contribute to the epistemic responsibility of Reformed Epistemology.

After conducting a methodological discussion about inductive arguments, engaging with the philosophy of science developed by Carl Hempel (1966), Swinburne clarifies his objective: to demonstrate that the conjunction of various inductive arguments can lead to the conclusion that the existence of God is most likely than not. For this, Swinburne uses the Bayes Theorem, which is represented as follows:

$$P(t/e) = \frac{P(e/t) P(t)}{P(e)}$$

$P(t/e)$  is the probability of theism given the evidence;  $P(e/t)$  is the probability of evidence given theism;  $P(t)$  is the previous probability of theism; and  $P(e)$  is the previous probability of the evidence. Therefore, Swinburne intends to demonstrate that the probability of theism given the evidence is higher than the probability of non-theism given the same evidence, i.e., that  $P(t/e)$  is higher than  $P(\sim t/e)$ .

After the methodological discussion about Bayes Theorem, Swinburne analyses the intrinsic probability of theism. On this question, Swinburne defends that, relative to other competing hypotheses, it is a high probability, given the simplicity of such a hypothesis (2004, pp. 109).

Then, Swinburne starts the considerations about the arguments themselves. The first one addressed by Swinburne is an inductive version of the cosmological argument (2004, pp. 133), arguing that the existence of the universe can be better explained in the case of God's existence than in the case of His non-existence. Then, he addresses various teleological arguments to argue, based on contemporary physics theories, that they are collectively a powerful inductive argument in favor of the existence of God (2004, pp. 189). The theistic philosopher also addresses arguments from consciousness, employing substance dualism (2004, pp. 209-212), and from moral awareness (2004, pp. 218).

Subsequently, Swinburne presents what he calls the "argument from providence" (2004, pp. 219), which starts from the idea that human freedom to act morally well is better explained by theism than by its denial. He also considers the problem of evil, admitting that it reduces the probability of theism (2004, pp. 266). However, he further argues that there are good historical indications of miracles (2004, pp. 292). Furthermore, it is necessary to explain religious experiences (2004, pp. 326). These latter arguments, taken in isolation, have no force, but Swinburne believes that, taken together with the entire previous discussion, they add some probability to theism. The result, therefore, is

that "On our total evidence theism is more probable than not" (Swinburne 2004, pp. 342). In a formal approach, it means that:

$$P(t/e) > P(\sim t/e)$$

Obviously, it is possible that Swinburne's reasoning may not work as he truly believes. That is not the issue here. My intention is merely to demonstrate that if Swinburne's argument is a good argument, then an evidentialist approach can complement Plantinga's reformed epistemology and help to respond to the objection of the epistemic irresponsibility. For now, my conclusion about Swinburne's cumulative case is that the argument is not a *proof* for the existence of God, but this argument demonstrates that belief in God has positive reasons, although not definitively, in his favor. Therefore, Swinburne's argument can be a situation in which is perceived that the theistic believer is positively rational.

## 5 – Reformed Evidentialism and Swinburne's cumulative case

Here arises the question: how can Swinburne's cumulative case contribute to Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology? We saw here that the argument does not prove the existence of God but demonstrates that theistic belief is positively rational. I will defend here that the knowledge of Swinburne's cumulative case can provide a situation in which Calvin's *sensus divinitatis* generate theistic belief. We saw here that, if theistic belief is true, the *sensus divinitatis* generates this belief through a variety of circumstances like the afterglow or the beautiful smile of a beloved woman. I believe that knowledge of Swinburne's cumulative case can be a circumstance of this type.

I propose an analogy. I think that Plantinga (and Calvin too), would accept that romantic love can be a circumstance for the *sensus divinitatis*. After all, the reformed philosopher defends emphatically that the human *Eros* can be a symbol of God's love (Plantinga 2000, pp. 354-352). In this case, the *sensus divinitatis* can work when two lovers walk on a starry night, when the moon shares his light with the sea. One of the lovers can look at his girlfriend, perceive his beauty and sing *Con Te Partirò* by Andrea Bocelli. Maybe the lover can be taken by the *sensus divinitatis* to think that only God can make someone so beautiful like his girlfriend. The theistic belief of this lover is basic; the love's situation only provides the work of *sensus divinitatis*. Theistic belief is not based on arguments here: is properly basic and proportioned by the loving situation.

A similar thing can occur with Swinburne's cumulative case in the Reformed Epistemology. If theistic belief is true, the knowledge of this argument can provide a situation where people see that theistic believer is positively rational. In this situation, the *sensus divinitatis* can work to generate a theistic belief. In this case, the belief is not based on the argument; because the belief is generated by the *sensus divinitatis* and the argument only has provided a situation for the *sensus divinitatis*. Therefore, even in this argumentative case, theistic belief can be, if true, properly basic.

One might ask how arguments can provide an occasion or situation, but not an evidential reason, for the emergence of belief in God.<sup>1</sup> Using Swinburne's cumulative case as an example, the central idea is that theistic belief is not propositionally based on the conclusion that the existence of God is more probable than not. This means that the argument is not a ground of theistic belief. Instead, there is an occasion or situation when a person knows the cumulative case (of course, there is an occasion or situation when anything occurs). The knowledge of the argument can be an evidential reason, but this is not necessary. If theistic belief is true, the quoted situation can provide *sensus divinitatis* action. And *sensus divinitatis* generates theistic belief in a properly basic way,

<sup>1</sup> I thank an anonymous referee for this question.

satisfying the warrant conditions. In this case, the knowledge of the argument does not need to be an evidential reason, but only an occasion or situation. Then, there is no reason to think that Reformed Evidentialism is impossible.

Of course, there are similarities and differences between Plantinga's A/C model and Reformed Evidentialism model. As an example of similarity, Plantinga does not refuse the possibilities of evidence for dealing with defeaters of theistic belief, which is embraced by Reformed Evidentialism. But the difference is that, in Plantinga's model, evidence is not part of the generation of theistic belief. In contrast, the proposal here is that evidential arguments can be part of the generation of theistic belief.

## 6 – Reformed Evidentialism and epistemic responsibility

Returning to the objection that Reformed Epistemology is epistemically irresponsible, we can ask if Reformed Evidentialism is epistemically irresponsible. And the answer seems clearly not. After all, according to Reformed Evidentialism, even if theistic belief is basic, there is a concern about adequate evidence. If the theistic believer analyses the evidence available, reflects about it, and still yet maintains a relatively high credence for theistic belief, there is no reason to think that the believer is irresponsible.

Actually, if evidence for theism is good (for example, if Swinburne's cumulative case is a good argument), then the theistic believer that analyses the evidence is epistemically responsible, even if theistic belief is not based on evidence. Maybe an example can help with this question. Suppose that John is a theistic philosopher and that he believes in the existence of God because of *sensus divinitatis* in a process like Reformed Evidentialism. Therefore, his belief in God is, as Plantinga says, properly basic. Imagine that in  $t_1$  the credence for John's belief in God is 0.7. But, at  $t_2$  John had studied about the religious diversity at the world and now he has some doubts about theistic belief. Consequently, at  $t_2$  his credence in theistic belief is 0.5.

However, at  $t_3$  John remembers that he agrees with Swinburne's cumulative case and that this argument is a good one and he raises his credence to 0.7. It is necessary to perceive that the theistic belief continues to be properly basic; what changes with the evidence is only the credence of theistic belief. The results of this hypothetical case are outlined below:

Time	Situation	Belief	Credence
$t_1$	<i>Sensus divinitatis</i>	Properly basic with relatively high confidence	0.7
$t_2$	<i>Sensus divinitatis</i> and the problem of religious diversity	Properly basic with relatively low confidence	0.5
$t_3$	<i>Sensus divinitatis</i> , the problem of religious diversity, and Swinburne's cumulative case	Properly basic with relatively high confidence	0.7

Because of this, I believe that Bruno Uchôa is correct when he says that evidentialism can help the theistic believer to deal with possible defeaters of theistic belief (Uchôa 2011, pp. 240). There is no reason to think that, in this case, John is epistemically irresponsible. In fact, John believes in the existence of God in a properly basic way but analyses the



evidence carefully. Consequently, Reformed Evidentialism can be epistemically responsible.

## 7 – Final observations

Two final observations are necessary. First, someone can object that this view of epistemic responsibility can be applied only to people like theistic philosophers of religion, but not to non-philosophers, which are the most part of theistic communities. Consequently, this objection concludes that epistemic responsibility is not a property of many believers. However, to respond to this objection, I believe that social epistemology is interesting here.

To return to our last example, in John's theistic community, there is an adult man called Francis and this man does not have a deep knowledge of philosophy or science. He knows only the basics of these things, sufficiently to be a rational person. Sometimes, a doubt (because of the religious diversity in the world, for example) arises in Francis' mind. But Francis remembers that there is an expert called John that knows a good argument for the existence of God. Francis' belief is properly basic, but John's evidence can give epistemic responsibility to Francis. Therefore, the epistemic responsibility of Reformed Evidentialism is not restricted only to people like theistic philosophers of religion.

Second, in this work, I give attention only to Swinburne's cumulative case for theism. However, I believe that Reformed Evidentialism can include other theistic arguments, like the *Kalam* Cosmological Argument or the Modal Ontological Argument. My point is not a commitment with a specific argument, but only the possibility that Reformed Epistemology can be enriched with an evidentialist approach to belief in God.

In conclusion, the epistemic responsibility of a reformed epistemologist can be increased by the evidence of theistic belief. In this case, the source of theistic belief continues to be the *sensus divinitatis* and the belief continues to be properly basic. But an evidentialist approach, like Swinburne's cumulative case, can increase the credence of belief in God.<sup>2</sup>

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