An Onto-Axiological Argument for the Existence of God

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Abstract
The article presents an Onto-Axiological Argument for the existence of God, formalized in first-order logic. It combines ontological and axiological principles, arguing that God is superior to all other entities in all relevant aspects, including the aspect of being. The existence of contingent entities is an a posteriori premise of the argument, which culminates in a formal demonstration of God's existence in act. The consistency of the underlying theory is demonstrated through a very simple model, and its interpretation is succinctly discussed in relation to Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, although it is applicable to other philosophical contexts. The argument seeks logical rigor and conceptual clarity, offering a novel contribution to debates on the existence of God.

Keywords: Onto-Axiological Argument. God's Existence. First-Order Logic. Axiology. Metaphysics.

[UM ARGUMENTO ONTO-AXIOLÓGICO A FAVOR DA EXISTÊNCIA DE DEUS]

Resumo
O artigo apresenta um Argumento Onto-Axiológico a favor da existência de Deus, formalizado em lógica de primeira ordem. Ele combina princípios ontológicos e axiológicos, argumentando que Deus é superior a todos os outros entes em todos os aspectos relevantes, incluindo o aspecto do ser. A existência de entes contingentes é uma premissa *a posteriori* do argumento, que culmina numa demonstração formal da existência de Deus em ato. A consistência da teoria subjacente é demonstrada através de um modelo muito simples, e sua interpretação é discutida sucintamente em relação à metafísica aristotélico-tomista, embora seja aplicável a outros contextos filosóficos. O argumento busca rigor lógico e clareza conceitual, oferecendo uma nova contribuição aos debates sobre a existência de Deus.

Palavras-chave: Argumento Onto-Axiológico. Existência de Deus. Lógica de Primeira Ordem. Axiologia. Metafísica.

0 Introduction

The question of God's existence has long been a central topic in philosophy, inspiring countless debates and diverse arguments. Among these, the ontological tradition stands out for its attempt to demonstrate God's existence using reason alone. In this article, we present the Onto-Axiological Argument, a formal approach grounded in first-order logic (FOL) that shares certain features with the ontological family of arguments while introducing a critical distinction. Unlike classical ontological arguments, which are traditionally framed as what one might call entirely a priori, the Onto-Axiological Argument incorporates an a posteriori premise, establishing a hybrid framework for reasoning about God's existence. While it retains the ontological focus on God as a being superior to all others, its foundation is also axiological, relying on the systematic comparison of entities under different meaningful aspects—most notably, the aspect of being.

The argument asserts that God is *better than* all other entities under every conceivable meaningful aspect, encompassing traditional positive attributes such as power and wisdom, as well as negative attributes like ignorance and weakness, where superiority entails the absence of such deficiencies. Crucially, the argument centers on the *aspect of being*, claiming that being in act is superior to not being in act under this aspect. This axiological focus situates the argument within metaphysical traditions that emphasize the primacy of actuality and the convertibility of being and goodness. By combining ontological and axiological principles with the formal precision of FOL, the Onto-Axiological Argument constructs a framework that aims to demonstrate that God, as a being satisfying these conditions, exists in act.

Departing from purely ontological approaches, the Onto-Axiological Argument assumes an a posteriori premise: the existence of contingent entities distinct from God. By integrating this premise, the argument transcends reliance on conceptual analysis alone, achieving greater logical rigor and coherence through its formalized structure. To this end, a first-order theory T_θ will be outlined to encapsulate the premises underlying the argument. Although the technical details of constructing the formal theory—such as specifying the syntax, defining well-formed formulas, and establishing the semantics of the logical system—will not be fully detailed, the key components necessary for understanding it will be highlighted.

The article is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the concept of God as the Supreme Being, formulates foundational axioms, and establishes the minimal properties of the 'better than' relation, which provides a basis for comparisons across meaningful aspects. Section 2 builds on this framework by examining the primacy of actual existence, introducing additional axioms, and exploring the implications of being in act versus non-being. In Section 3, the argument unfolds in two stages: a formal proof in FOL and a natural-language version of the argument to enhance accessibility and understanding. Moreover, a very simple model is provided to establish the consistency of our theory T_θ. By focusing on the aspect of being and its axiological implications, the Onto-Axiological Argument offers a novel contribution to philosophical discourse. The conclusion that *God exists in act* follows necessarily, provided one accepts classical logic as defined by FOL standards and the argument's premises. Furthermore, the basic metaphysical interpretation of the formulas within T_θ is discussed, particularly against the backdrop of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. However, since the semantics of the logical framework are not fixed to a single metaphysical tradition, interpretations within other philosophical traditions

can also validate the theory, and the conclusions obtained remain across these diverse perspectives.

1 The concept of God as Supreme Being

The concept of God central to this discussion arises from the classical theistic perspective, which understands God as the ultimate and absolute reality. Rigorously speaking, if God exists, then He cannot be fully conceptualized. As St. Augustine famously observed, *"si enim comprehendis, non est Deus"* ("indeed, if you comprehend it, it is not God").[1] Nonetheless, within the classical theistic tradition, it has been deemed possible to grasp the term 'God' to a minimal degree. When we speak of God, some concept—however vague or approximate—is inevitably invoked. In reflecting on God as an object of thought, whether or not He exists in actuality, we place Him within a universe of discourse, albeit as a uniquely exceptional object. This duality allows the articulation of the principle that God, by definition, is superior to all other beings in every meaningful respect. This conception does not place God as merely one being among others but highlights His unique relationship to all other beings.

Within this framework, the relationship between God and created beings is illuminated: God, as conceived in this proposal, necessarily surpasses any created entity in every valid and meaningful aspect. This understanding is rooted in the traditional view of God as a maximal, self-existent, and transcendent being, fundamentally distinct from the contingent and limited nature of created entities. This view implies that, while everything in the created universe is finite, dependent, and defined by limitations, God is infinite, independent, and absolutely unlimited. Therefore, any positive meaningful attribute that can be conceived—such as goodness, power, wisdom, or beauty—reaches its maximal perfection in God, so that no created entity can rival or even approach the fullness that God possesses in Himself. The notion of God as *"id quo nihil maius cogitari potest"* ("that than which nothing greater can be conceived")[2] as articulated by St. Anselm, encapsulates this understanding.

To formally capture such a concept of God, we adopt **A1** as a fundamental axiom in our first-order context. This axiom provides a logical foundation for articulating God's superiority in all meaningful aspects. By "aspects," we mean attributes, qualities, or points of view that can be used to compare objects in our domain of discourse of possible beings. An aspect can be admitted into our system if it is reasonable as a criterion for comparing objects with God. In other words, aspects will be considered meaningful insofar as they conceptually pertain to attributes that are relatively or analogically shared, or understood according to participation, between created or contingent beings and a divine being. Thus, aspects that are overly particular, and for which no minimal axiological 'better than' relationship can be clearly established with God, are excluded.

A1. $\forall x \forall y \forall z \, ((A(z) \wedge D(x) \wedge \neg D(y)) \rightarrow M(x,y,z))$

(*For any x, y, and z, if z is an aspect, x is God, and y is not God, then x is better than y with respect to z.*)

We adopt the following interpretation:

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[1] St. Augustine of Hippo, *Sermo* 117, 3, 5: PL 38, 663.

[2] St. Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, 2.

- o A(z): "z is an aspect" (e.g., an attribute or quality such as power, wisdom, ignorance, or weakness);
- o D(x): "x is God";
- o M(x,y,z): "x is better than y with respect to z".

Axiom **A1** formalizes the claim that God surpasses all other entities in every valid aspect, whether positive or negative. While positive aspects, such as wisdom or power, clearly illustrate God's maximality, negative aspects, such as ignorance or weakness, must also be considered. In these cases, being superior does not mean possessing these negative qualities to a greater degree but being entirely devoid of them. For instance, God is superior in the aspect of ignorance not by being more ignorant, but by being entirely free from it. Thus, God is not only better under positive aspects but also transcends limitations represented by negative aspects.

Thus, the first steps are given to establish the first-order logical theory T_θ.

Of course, this discussion extends beyond merely defining or conceptualizing God. Instead, it aims to determine whether a God conceived in this manner exists in actuality. To this end, the domain of discourse is defined to encompass the set of all possible beings, understood as those that are non-contradictory.[3] The question of whether a being satisfying this concept can exist depends on first establishing its logical possibility. Specifically, we must ascertain whether the concept of God, as outlined by **A1**, corresponds to a logically possible entity within our domain.

Since the argument proceeds in first-order logic, it will become evident that the concept of God, as we assume it, is logically possible because the theory we develop will be shown to have a model. By demonstrating that the theory has a model, we verify the logical consistency of the theory and, consequently, the possibility of God as conceived here. This foundation paves the way for examining whether a being satisfying the concept of God actually exists.[4]

In **A1**, we utilize the triadic relation M, which allows us to compare objects under distinct aspects. It is therefore important to establish a minimal set of conditions for this relation. While it may not be necessary to provide an exhaustive account of M, one plausible property is that it should be asymmetric. This helps ensure that the hierarchy being constructed is reasonably structured and avoids potential conflicts. Specifically, it would seem incoherent for something to be simultaneously better and worse than another under the same aspect.

Thus, we admit the following axiom:

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[3] A core aspect of our argument lies in admitting logically possible objects (i.e., non-contradictory) into the domain of discourse, which allows variables representing such objects to fall under the scope of the existential quantifier. Furthermore, we will use a specific predicate E to indicate the actual existence of an object, thereby distinguishing between merely possible objects and those that are both possible and actual. For example, we may consider natural numbers as possible objects, while human beings alive at this very moment are both possible and actual objects. The predicate of actual existence can be applied to the latter, but not to the former, as natural numbers lack actual existence—unless, for instance, one adopts a Platonic perspective or considers specific numbers as ideas in act within the mind of a particular subject at a given time.

[4] Moreover, it is clear that Axiom **A1** is satisfied even if no object satisfies the predicate D, since in that case, the antecedent of the implication would be false, rendering the implication true.

A2. $\forall x \forall y \forall z \, (A(z) \rightarrow (M(x,y,z) \rightarrow \neg M(y,x,z)))$

(*For any x, y, and z, if z is an aspect, then if x is better than y with respect to z, y is not better than x with respect to z.*)

This axiom aligns with our intuition about a hierarchy of beings, establishing that relationships of being 'better than' are directional and cannot reverse. Since we assume that M is asymmetric, it follows that M is also irreflexive, meaning no entity can be better than itself. However, we require M to define only as much structure as is necessary for the discussion, recognizing that a complete order over all entities, for example, is likely neither appropriate nor relevant to our purposes. These additional considerations go beyond our immediate goals and are not essential for the construction of our system.

By introducing θ as a distinguished constant in our theory, we formalize the notion of God as a specific entity within the domain of discourse. The predicate $D(x)$, which designates "is God," is now explicitly applied to θ, assuming that this constant represents the being that fulfills the conditions laid out in **A1**. This leads us to admit the following axiom:

A3. $D(\theta)$

(*God is God*)

Thus, we can regard God as both the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This axiom does not assert the actual existence of θ, but rather identifies it as a possible (non-contradictory) being within the domain. As stated, in the system under construction, our domain encompasses all logically possible entities, not merely those that exist in actuality. This distinction is crucial for preserving the theoretical flexibility of our discussion, enabling us to reason about θ as a logically possible entity without prematurely asserting its actual existence.

In the next section, we will outline the assumptions underlying the concept of actual existence, including the premises for comparing objects in terms of being. These considerations will clarify the criteria for comparison, establishing a foundation for evaluating the ontological hierarchy in our system and supporting our investigation into the ontological status of God.

2 Being in act is better than not being in act

The idea that being in act is better than not being in act seems intuitively plausible to many and finds strong support in several philosophical traditions. Existence, as the realization of actuality, perfection, or potential, is often granted primacy over non-existence, which signifies a privation of these qualities. Across various philosophical traditions being is regarded as the foundation of all value, intelligibility, and relationality. Non-being, by contrast, is understood as lacking the actuality and attributes that confer significance or allow for meaningful interaction within the world.

This intuition is particularly developed in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, where the concepts of actuality, potentiality, and the convertibility of being and goodness provides a robust framework for affirming the primacy of being.

In Aristotle's metaphysics and natural philosophy, for example, being in act is closely tied to the actualization of potential and the realization of a thing's essence. For Aristotle, what exists in act is not only more real but also reflects the culmination of what something is meant to be, a concept he applies to both natural processes and the hierarchy of beings. In *Generation of Animals*, Aristotle notes:

> "But soul is better than body, and the animate is better than the inanimate, **because being is better than not being**, and living is better than not living" (*Generation of Animals*, ii 1, 731b 20, emphasis ours).

In the passage, Aristotle reflects on the superiority of being over non-being in the context of natural processes such as life and generation, where being and actuality signify vitality and completion. The soul, as the principle of life, exemplifies the inherent preference for ensouled beings over lifeless ones, and for existence over its absence. This passage suggests that being in act is not only foundational but also naturally regarded as better because it enables life, growth, and flourishing.

Thomas Aquinas builds on this Aristotelian foundation, expanding it into a broader metaphysical account where being (*esse*) is identified as the act of all things and the basis of all perfection. For Aquinas, being and goodness are convertible, meaning that whatever exists, insofar as it exists, is good. He states:

> "Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; [...] But everything is perfect so far as it is actual." ["*bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum rationem tantum*. [...] *Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu*"] (*Summa Theologiae* Iª q. 5 a. 1 co.).

This equivalence implies that being is inherently desirable and preferable to non-being. He further emphasizes that:

> "Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection" ["*omne ens, inquantum est ens, est bonum. Omne enim ens, inquantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum, quia omnis actus perfectio quaedam est.*"] (*Summa Theologiae* Iª q. 5 a. 3 co.).

Through this reasoning, Aquinas affirms that being in act is the fullest realization of potential and the condition for all goodness and perfection. Non-being, in contrast, signifies the absence of these qualities and can only be understood as a privation of the act of existence or good.

While this perspective is compelling within its metaphysical framework, it is worth acknowledging that such claims might not resonate equally across all philosophical traditions. However, even those who question this principle must inevitably depend on their own existence in act to formulate and express their critique, thereby implicitly affirming the practical primacy of being. Anyway, our proposal here is not to assume that actual existence is better than non-existence *simpliciter*—although this may be considered plausible—but rather that a being that exists in actuality is better than a

being that does not exist in actuality under a very specific aspect: the aspect of being. Viewing the aspect of being as meaningful and positive, and therefore as a criterion for axiological comparison, establishes that an object existing in actuality is better than one that does not.

These considerations lead us to the acceptance of the following axiom:

A4. $\forall x \forall y (E(x) \wedge \neg E(y) \rightarrow M(x,y,s))$

(*For any x and y, if x exists in act and y does not, then x is better than y with respect to the aspect of being),*

where E(x) signifies that "x exists in act", and s represents "the aspect of being".

This axiom encapsulates the intuitive and philosophical acknowledgment of the primacy of actual existence, under the aspect of being. While subject to interpretation, it aligns with Aristotle's natural hierarchy of being and Aquinas's identification of being with perfection and goodness. Together, these perspectives offer a coherent foundation for understanding the centrality of actual being in metaphysical inquiry.

The complementary premises required for our argument are quite straightforward. First, we assume that there is at least a being that exists in act and is not God. It can be considered an a posteriori premise in our argument. This assumption establishes a clear distinction between the finite, contingent beings of the world and the infinite, necessary being traditionally identified as God. It also allows us to consider observable entities, such as the Sun, without conflating them with divinity—a reasonable and intuitive distinction. Second, we affirm that the aspect of being is indeed a meaningful aspect, an expected assumption within the context of our metaphysical discussion.

Thus, the axioms **A5** and **A6** are also assumed:

A5. $\exists x (E(x) \wedge \neg D(x))$

(*There is at least a being x that exists in act and is not God.*)

A6. A(s)

(*The aspect of being is an aspect.*)

With the foundational axioms established, we now turn to the core of the discussion: developing the argument for God's actual existence. Building on the implications of being in act and the hierarchical relationships outlined, we are prepared to formally demonstrate the coherence and implications of this framework.

3. Onto-Axiological Argument

In this section, the argument will be presented in two parts. First, a formalized proof in first-order logic will rigorously establish the claim, ensuring logical precision. Second, a formal natural-language explanation will accompany the formalized proof, translating its key steps into a more accessible format for broader understanding. Together, these approaches aim to clarify the reasoning behind the argument while

demonstrating the compatibility of the axioms with the actual existence of a being that satisfies the concept of God.

Theorem. $\vdash_{T_\theta} \exists x(D(x) \wedge E(x))$

(*God exists in act.*)

Proof.

1.	$\forall x \forall y \forall z((A(z) \wedge D(x) \wedge \neg D(y)) \rightarrow M(x,y,z))$	: **A1**
2.	$\forall x \forall y \forall z(M(x,y,z) \rightarrow \neg M(y,x,z))$	: **A2**
3.	$\forall x \forall y((E(x) \wedge \neg E(y)) \rightarrow M(x,y,s))$	: **A3**
4.	$D(\theta)$	: **A4**
5.	$\exists x(E(x) \wedge \neg D(x))$	: **A5**
6.	$A(s)$	: **A6**
7.	$A(s) \wedge D(\theta)$	: Conjunction 6, 4
8.	$E(t) \wedge \neg D(t)$	: Instantiation 5
9.	$E(t)$	: Conjunction 8
10.	$\neg D(t)$	: Conjunction 8
11.	$A(s) \wedge D(\theta) \wedge \neg D(t)$	: Conjunction 7, 10
12.	$(A(s) \wedge D(\theta) \wedge \neg D(t)) \rightarrow M(\theta,t,s)$	: Specification 1
13.	$M(\theta,t,s)$	: *Modus Ponens* 11, 12
14.	$M(\theta,t,s) \rightarrow \neg M(t,\theta,s)$	: Specification 2
15.	$\neg M(t,\theta,s)$	: *Modus Ponens* 13, 14
16.	$\neg E(\theta)$	: Hypothesis
17.	$E(t) \wedge \neg E(\theta)$	: Conjunction 9, 16
18.	$(E(t) \wedge \neg E(\theta)) \rightarrow M(t,\theta,s)$	: Specification 3
19.	$M(t,\theta,s)$	: *Modus Ponens* 17, 18
20.	$M(t,\theta,s) \wedge \neg M(t,\theta,s)$	: Conjunction 19, 15
21.	$\neg\neg E(\theta)$	: *Reductio ad absurdum* 16-20
22.	$E(\theta)$	: Double Negation 21
23.	$D(\theta) \wedge E(\theta)$	: Conjunction 4, 22
24.	$\exists x(D(x) \wedge E(x))$	: Existential Introduction 23 - *QED*.

In natural language:

1. *For any x, y, and z, if z is an aspect, x is God, and y is not God, then x is better than y with respect to z.* (Axiom **A1**)
2. *For any x, y, and z, if x is better than y with respect to z, then y is not better than x with respect to z.* (Axiom **A2**)
3. *For any x and y, if x exists in act and y does not, then x is better than y with respect to the aspect of being.* (Axiom **A3**)
4. *God is God.* (Axiom **A4**)
5. *There is at least a being x such that x exists in act and x is not God.* (Axiom **A5**)
6. *The aspect of being is an aspect.* (Axiom **A6**)
7. *The aspect of being is an aspect, and God is God.* (Conjunction of 6 and 4)
8. *There is a being t such that t exists in act and t is not God.* (Instantiation of 5)

9. *t exists in act.* (Conjunction from 8)
10. *t is not God.* (Conjunction from 8)
11. *The aspect of being is an aspect, God is God, and t is not God.* (Conjunction of 7 and 10)
12. *If the aspect of being is an aspect, God is God, and t is not God, then God is better than t with respect to the aspect of being.* (Specification of **A1**)
13. *God is better than t with respect to the aspect of being.* (*Modus Ponens* from 11 and 12)
14. *If God is better than t with respect to the aspect of being, then t is not better than God with respect to the aspect of being.* (Specification of A2)
15. *t is not better than God with respect to the aspect of being.* (*Modus Ponens* from 13 and 14)
16. *Suppose God does not exist in act.* (Hypothesis)
17. *t exists in act, and God does not exist in act.* (Conjunction of 9 and 16)
18. *If t exists in act and God does not exist in act, then t is better than God with respect to the aspect of being.* (Specification of **A3**)
19. *t is better than God with respect to the aspect of being.* (*Modus Ponens* from 17 and 18)
20. *t <u>is</u> better than God with respect to the aspect of being and t <u>is not</u> better than God with respect to the aspect of being.* (Conjunction of 19 and 15)
21. *Contradiction.* (From 20)
22. *God exists in act.* (*Reductio ad absurdum* from 16–20)
23. *God is God and exists in act.* (Conjunction of 4 and 22)
24. *There is a being x such that x is God and x exists in act.* (Existential Introduction from 23). ***Quod Erat Demonstrandum***.

So, God's actual existence is proven as a theorem in the theory T_θ. The formal proof demonstrates that the existence of God is not an assumption, but a logical conclusion derived from the axioms of the theory.

Concerning the consistency of the assumptions made, let us consider the following set-theoretical interpretation * for T_θ:

Domain = {0, 1}
$s^* = \theta^* = 0$
$A^* = D^* = \{0\}$
$M^* = \{(0,1,0)\}$
$E^* = \{1,0\}$

It is easy to verify that such an interpretation satisfies the axioms **A1** to **A6**, therefore, providing a model for the first-order theory T_θ. By the Completeness Theorem for FOL, T_θ is consistent. This demonstrates that the theory is free of contradictions, and therefore, it makes sense to admit that the concept of God, formalized specifically in Axiom **A1**, refers to a possible object.

The simplicity of our model highlights a crucial insight: the interpretation of θ can coincide with the interpretation of the aspect of being s. This correspondence resonates

with the Thomistic perspective, exemplified by the view that God's essence is identical to His being (*Ipsum Esse Subsistens*).

For more advanced models incorporating additional aspects and entities, the most significant triples would typically position God in the first coordinate, aspects in the third, and all other entities distinct from God in the second. This arrangement elucidates the relationships, particularly under the aspect of being, and offers a clear visualization of the ontological hierarchy inherent in the argument.

4 Conclusions

The Onto-Axiological Argument offers a comprehensive and innovative approach that seamlessly integrates ontological and axiological reasoning to address the profound question of God's actual existence.

With regard to arguments classified as ontological, it seems worth highlighting some differences between our argument and the renowned one proposed by Anselm. He argues that God is the being than which nothing greater can be conceived, a concept that, according to Anselm, necessarily includes actual existence. His approach involves identifying a contradiction in assuming that God does not exist while it remains possible to conceive of a being that satisfies the concept and exists. Various critiques have been presented against this argument, one example being the contention that the transition from the conceptual to the real is not legitimate. Consequently, it is argued that one cannot definitively conclude that God exists in this way. However, a more nuanced interpretation suggests that the Anselm's argument demonstrates that the proper way to conceive of God is to conceive of Him as existing, even if He does not exist in actuality.

In contrast, our argument begins by considering the concept of God as the being superior to all others in every relevant aspect, including the aspect of being. From this concept, we conclude that there must exist, within the domain of possible objects, at least one object that corresponds to it. Thus, we admit the existence of the object 'God' as a possible entity in our domain of discourse. Our domain, however, is structured to include both merely possible objects and actual objects. The central question, then, is whether the object 'God' is merely possible or also actual. If God were merely possible, that is, lacking actuality, then the existence of an actual, non-divine being would render it superior to the possible object 'God' under the aspect of being. This would contradict the initial "definition" of God as the being superior in all aspects. Consequently, there would no longer exist, within the domain of possible objects, an object that satisfies the predicate 'God,' rendering the object 'God' itself impossible in our domain. To avoid this contradiction, we conclude that the object 'God' must not only exist as a possible object but also as an actual object in our domain, ensuring consistency with its defining predicate as the being superior in every aspect, including the aspect of being.

While Anselm's argument compares concepts and concludes that the concept of God must include existence, our argument operates within a different framework. The theory T_θ, as developed in the article, is interpreted from a metaphysical perspective, establishing it as a *basic formal metaphysics*. Again, unlike Anselm's purely conceptual approach, our argument considers not only conceptual objects but also distinguishes between merely possible objects and actual objects within the domain of discourse. The axioms **A3** and **A5** addressing the existence of actual beings play a pivotal role in

this framework. These axioms provide the necessary bridge between the logical realm of possibilities and the metaphysical realm of actuality, ensuring that the transition is not arbitrary but rigorously justified. Thus, the argument concludes that God must exist in actuality to avoid contradiction. This bridge from possibility to actuality is grounded in the metaphysical interpretation of T_θ, making the actual existence of God not just a conceptual requirement but a metaphysical reality firmly situated within the domain of actual objects, according to our proposal.

Rooted in the axiological primacy of being, our argument for the actual existence of God serves as a robust foundation for addressing deeper philosophical inquiries about the nature of reality, the hierarchy of existence, and the ultimate source of value. By harmonizing metaphysical principles with formal logical reasoning, we consider that the Onto-Axiological Argument contributes meaningfully to contemporary and classical debates on God's existence. The rigorously constructed yet adaptable system opens new avenues for exploration across diverse philosophical traditions, inviting further reflection on the implications of its findings.

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