Reformed Evidentialism and Epistemic Responsibility

Abstract

The Reformed Epistemology, developed by Alvin Plantinga, seeks to argue that belief in God can be considered properly basic in terms of justification and warrant. Plantinga claims that a theistic believer does not need evidential reasons for their belief in God. However, some may argue that due to the lack of evidence, Reformed Epistemology could be considered epistemically irresponsible. This objection, grounded on Clifford's evidentialism, claims that a responsible epistemology is deeply related to sufficient evidence, and Plantinga's epistemology does not care with sufficient evidence about God. To answer the quoted objection, this work aims to relate Plantinga's epistemology to an evidentialist defence of theistic belief. For this, Swinburne's cumulative case, which defends that the existence of God is more likely than not, will be particularly analysed, defending that, if Swinburne's argument is good, then it can be helpful to a rational belief in God. The goal is to demonstrate how evidentialism can complement Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology, strengthening the credence of belief in God. This claim is called Reformed Evidentialism. In conclusion, it will be argued that although theistic belief may be considered properly basic, an evidentialist approach like Swinburne's cumulative case can increase the credence of theistic belief. Consequently, Reformed Evidentialism is not epistemically irresponsible; after all, although belief in God is properly basic, and not based on evidence, a theistic believer who knows the evidence can consider the evidence carefully.