Naive Metaphysics and Fregean Truth

Autores/as

  • Ívore Campos de Mira Universidade Estadual de Campinas

DOI:

10.69577/2965-6257.2024.25

Palabras clave:

Metaphysics, Epistemology, Truth, Judgment, Frege

Resumen

In this paper we will look at Frege's work under a metaphysical lens aiming to identify crucial concepts to be employed in the treatment of objectivity. After presenting the principle of epistemological simplicity and its relation to objectivity through a discussion about naive metaphysics, we analyze how meaning and truth can be employed to understand apparent reality. On the central matter of the nature of truth, we will argue that, under a naive metaphysical perspective, its indefinability is a desirable feature and that it could be advantageous to study truth in terms of an internal and an external versions of judgment. We conclude with some brief examples of applications of these notions.

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Citas

Frege, G., “Begriffsschrift (1879): Selections (Preface and Part 1)”, in M. Beaney, The Frege Reader. Blackwell, 1997, pp. 47-78.

Frege, G., “On Sinn and Bedeutung (1892)”, in M. Beaney, The Frege Reader. Blackwell, 1997, pp. 151-171.

Frege, G., “Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Volume I (1893): Selections (Preface, Introduction, §§1-7, 26-29, 32-33) ”, in M. Beaney, The Frege Reader. Blackwell, 1997, pp. 194-223.

Frege, G., “Thought (1918)”, in M. Beaney, The Frege Reader. Blackwell, 1997, pp. 325-345.

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Publicado

2024-12-19
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MIRA, Ívore Campos de. Naive Metaphysics and Fregean Truth. Atlantika: International Journal on Philosophy, Rio de Janeiro, v. 2, n. 2, p. 25–37, 2024. DOI: 10.69577/2965-6257.2024.25. Disponível em: https://revistaatlantika.com.br/ra/article/view/25. Acesso em: 7 mar. 2026.

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